ABSTRACT. One of the problems addressed by the EU Directive on Package Travel (1990) is that of travellers who find themselves stranded in their holiday destination when their tour operator suddenly goes bankrupt. The recent insolvency of Austrian and German tour operators illustrates the relevance of this question. This paper argues that travellers should be protected against the risk of insolvency of tour operators. The paper sets out the reasons for this, the various ways of insolvency protection, and the implementation of the Package Travel Directive. It then sets out what is secured by the guarantee, the obligations of the organizer and retailer, the cross-border implications, the possibility to choose freely the means of security, guarantee funds, insurance and social security, bonds and guarantees, trusts, and EC implications. It is argued that Member States should provide a higher standard of protection than the minimum standard of the Directive. A traveller should be entitled to compensation not only for immaterial damage but also for pure economic loss, such as the higher costs of an equivalent trip. The paper also argues that refund of prepayments should not be limited to the period before the trip has started. The traveller should also be reimbursed for extra costs incurred if he decides to stay at his destination. Finally, a traveller should be entitled to take care of his own repatriation, should he wish to do so. The paper finally argues that Member States should be held liable for late implementation of the Directive.
INTRODUCTION

Aim o f this P a p e r
On 13 June 1990, the Council o f the European C o m m u n i t y adopted a Directive on Package Travel. Article 7 of the Directive requires travel agencies to provide securities that guarantee their customers sufficient c o m p e n s a t i o n in case of bankruptcy. This article has resulted in travel g u a r a n t e e funds b e i n g f o u n d on the a g e n d a s o f all M e m b e r States o f the European Union. The questions that h a v e arisen are what alternatives may be offered to consumers, who should pay for the funds, and whether c o n s u m e r s should be represented on the boards responsible for the funds. This is not just a theoretical issue. The i n s o l v e n c y o f two G e r m a n tour operators before G e r m a n y had i m p l e m e n t e d the Directive, but after it should have done so, illustrates the importance of these questions.
Guarantee funds may be found in many trades and industries. Funds which are somewhat similar to those in the travel industry have been set up with regard to bank deposits, the building industry, building insulation, painters, and solicitors, among others.
It has been submitted by some authors that under the standstill provision of the Product Liability Directive, Member States are not allowed to establish funds. The 1995 evaluation of this Directive has not led to any change in this regard. Motor vehicle guarantee funds do generate a fair amount of case law, but these decisions involve issues which are quite different from the ones found in the travel industry. Even further removed from traditional consumer affairs are environmental funds and funds for crime victims.
In this paper, we will deal with what is secured by the guarantee, the obligations of the organizer and retailer, the cross-border implications, the possibility to choose freely the means of security, guarantee funds, insurance and social security, bonds and guarantees, trusts, EC implications, and state liability for late implementation. It will end with some conclusions.
Before going into these matters, we will first explore the following issues: why consumers should be protected against the insolvency of travel agencies, the various ways of insolvency protection, and the implementation of the Package Travel Directive.
Reasons
Why should consumers be protected against the insolvency of travel agencies?
It may be argued, against protection, that as a general rule everybody in business life bears the risk that his contractual partner may become insolvent. This allocation of the insolvency risk to the contractual partner seems appropriate because he has the freedom of choosing his counterpart. He may therefore assess the financial credibility of his debtor and, as a consequence, decide to enter a contract or abstain from doing so. There seems to be no reason why this risk should be borne by somebody else; yet this would be inevitably the result, if it were not allocated to the debtor's contractual partner.
